Reader Q&A: Jon Henley on Europe’s future – ‘Nobody really knows if it can get its act together’
Today’s opening of the Munich Security Conference marks a year since JD Vance’s blistering attack on European leaders signalled the start of a new world order – and huge questions for Europe about its future. Writing in the This Is Europe newsletter this week, Jon described this as Europe’s moment of reckoning as it faces what Emmanuel Macron called a “tsunami” of competition from China and a US that is “openly anti-European”. Along with our teams around the world, Jon has spent the past year covering the shape of Europe’s future – and what it means for nations across the continent, including France, where he is based. Jon has now finished answering your questions, but comments will stay open until 1:30pm GMT. Read the Q&A below. Question from senoj1: Do you think a two tier Europe will emerge – say France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Baltics – who will drive defence and therefore finance, with an outer ring more or less following on? Those furthest away from Russia (Spain Portugal Greece, Ireland etc?) Will a two-tier Europe lead to intra-continent squabbling and protectionism - effectively undermining the whole core concept of the EU - which is to avoid armed conflict between European nations? Jon: The answer in short is yes. The idea of a two-tier Europe has been around for decades under various names – two-tier, two-speed, multi-speed, concentric circles … It’s never taken off because, as you say, it’s been widely seen as divisive and contrary to the point of the EU. Member states have generally preferred to seek unanimity through concession and compromise. But there’s a growing realisation that the scale of the challenges the EU now faces: from China on trade, from the US on security (and trade), energy costs, the climate crisis) mean it’s going to happen sooner or later. At yesterday’s informal summit, France, Germany, Belgium and others spoke in favour of it in its latest incarnation: “enhanced cooperation”. Ursula von der Leyen, the commission president, put it succinctly: the bloc can no longer afford to move at the speed of its slowest members. So expect to see smaller groups of countries moving ahead in different areas, for example with moves to create a “savings and investment union” that would essentially keep Europeans’ savings in Europe and basically give the EU a single capital market.
Question from PartingSideways: Can the EU survive in its current form – especially with the current membership? It looks like at least two countries – Hungary and Slovakia – have essentially gone back under Russia’s “protection”. Ukraine and the Middle East have that shown a united voice is almost impossible. Human rights, especially LGBTQ+ rights, are increasingly fragile in a few EU countries. How can EU/Europe defend themselves if they have such wildly differing opinions on who “the enemy” is? Jon: This goes right to the heart of the Europe’s perennial dilemma of course: the EU is a work in progress, something that’s never been attempted before, a group of nearly 30 countries *voluntarily* collaborating and pooling sovereignty in key domains so they can operate more effectively. The problem is each of those countries has its own national interests and traditional positions (such as on Israel/Palestine) to defend, and each is headed by a government that tends to think first like most governments think first, which is to say electorally: how will this play with domestic public opinion. I think actually episodes like the pandemic and Ukraine have shown that the 27 can get their act together when it really matters, and usually find a way to deal with their differences (sometimes very creatively, especially with Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán, aka the EU’s “disrupter-in-chief”.) I think Brexit certainly taught everyone that leaving is a very bad idea. I think also more recently that Donald Trump’s attempted Greenland grab and what Emmanuel Macron calls the “Chinese trade tsunami” have really focused minds on the idea that small countries are stronger together. Plus – don’t forget the troublemakers are subject to the laws of national politics themselves: there’s a very fair chance Orbán could be out of power in April. That said, the same is true in the other direction: a President Le Pen (or, more likely, Bardella) would put the EU in a whole other place. Though then again, Georgia Meloni has not proved half the problem everyone thought she would be in Europe as PM of Italy, actually quite the reverse. So I think the rather unconvincing answer is: the EU will survive, but will continue to constantly evolve. Question from Hesfalleninthewater: Is there a case for the UK to declare neutrality, like Switzerland and Ireland, and focus on our considerable soft power rather than delude ourselves that we still have the military muscle to be relevant? Jon: Actually I think the UK still has more than enough military muscle to be relevant – if it can deploy it in conjunction with the EU. The Europeans certainly think so; it’s one of the few areas where they are actively seeking to improve cooperation. The UK has the second biggest army in Europe and it’s a nuclear power, obviously. I’m not really a defence expert, my colleague Dan Sabbagh would be better placed to answer on the detail, but if the present British government is really seeking to improve relations with Europe on eg trade, then defence remains pretty much its strongest bargaining chip (despite efforts by some EU govts to keep the two sectors separate). Also from Hesfalleninthewater: Why is the issue of digital sovereignty not more widely recognised and discussed? Almost every European country’s digital (and by extension physical) infrastructure and payments system is dependent on US technology which an autocratic president could order to be switched off. Can Europe realistically shake off this digital shock collar? Jon: It’s certainly being discussed at a very high level in Europe, though perhaps not very much out loud because it’s such a massive issue. There’s a European parliament report saying the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80% of digital products, services and infrastructure, mostly American though partly Chinese. This whole question ties into big European debates about technological sovereignty, industrial policy, “strategic autonomy” and now very clearly – given Trump’s determination to defend X, Meta, Google etc from what he calls European censorship – European trade policy. Individual governments are also acting. France, for example, has launched its own civil service video conferencing platform to avoid relying on Zoom/Google Meet etc. It’s a huge, many-faceted question to which there’s no easy answer - does the EU try to build its own alternatives, mitigate the risk, use its economic clout to enforce regulation? But safe to say it’s going to be a big bone of transatlantic tension in the years to come and unless both sides tackle it reasonably sensibly there’s a real risk to the common digital space. From Mikko_: For a layman it’s very hard to estimate how much rearming is enough – and what kind of hardware we truly need in the changing face of warfare. What are the estimates on the amount of arms we need, how fast and at what cost? Who makes these estimates and what are they based on? Jon: As I said I’m not really a defence expert either, sorry. What I can say is Nato has pledged to increase defence spending to 5% of national income by 2035 and the EU (which has 23 members in Nato) is in the middle of an €800bn military spending plan (that includes a €150bn loan secured against unused funds in the EU budget, plus more flexibility in EU fiscal rules so member states can spend €650bn themselves - so it depends on member states’ willingness to spend). The problem is that Europe has taken a half-century “holiday from history” under the formerly reliable US defence umbrella and nobody really knows if it can get its act together. It’s not an easy area for Europe – we’ve always struggled to join up defence spending, so there’s been lots of inefficient duplication and lots of different systems. And nobody’s ever bene able to say whether a “European army” should be EU-only or more broadly European, a new force commanded from Brussels, an improved version of existing joint forces. Once again, though, Greenland has really focused minds.
From Notwithpastry: Is there now a tacit agreement on spheres of interest between the super powers? If so, who gets what? Jon: That’s a question that needs a book to answer. China, the US and obviously (though it’s not a superpower) Russia have laid claim to pretty clear spheres of interest. I think the most relevant answer to this discussion is that the current state of the world is pushing Europe quite fast to the realisation that it needs to properly join the superpower club, and in its own very European way, which is to say haltingly, it’s starting to do the necessary (deepen and strengthen single market, reboot its economy, look after its own defence). Whether it will succeed is another question From ianhenrynw3: How serious do you think the risk of Russia invading the Baltic states, especially Latvia, is? And, do you think the proposed “Made in Europe” EU policy is designed to be a purely protectionist measure to “save” dying industrial sectors from competition from China? Do you think it will undermine the UK-EU TCA by erecting a new set of barriers to trade between the UK and the EU? Jon: Hi Ian, it’s hard to answer the first question because until the day he actually did it, everyone was convinced Vladimir Putin wouldn’t invade Ukraine. I don’t think he will invade a Nato and EU member state, but he certainly could. What he’s very likely to do though is increase the hybrid warfare, destabilisation tactics he’s already deploying and see what happens next. The proposed “Made in Europe” policy is quite new and not fully defined yet, though it featured high on the agenda at the informal summit yesterday. For those not familiar with it, the idea is to favour European companies in strategic sectors by imposing requirements on the EU and national governments to prioritise locally manufactured goods in public (both EU and national) contracts. The commission will publish proposed European content targets next month for key products like solar panels and electric cars. It’s long been a divisive subject – broadly, France and the southern European countries are in favour; Germany and the more free-trade-inclined northern European members against it. Macron sees European preference as defensive not protectionist, and essential faced with a China whose strategy is to achieve outright economic dominance through massive state subsidies. Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, doesn’t want any more EU regulations in general and favours a “made with Europe” policy works with Europe’s responsible trading partners. Von der Leyen has said any buy European policy would need to tread a very fine line between protecting/encouraging EU industry and pursuing open markets and new trade deals. I think it’s clear that as Macron says Europe will be “swept aside” industrially unless it does something - as things stand it can’t compete with the scale of Chinese subsidies. But it’s a very delicate line to walk. On the UK/EU agreement, Britain will obviously have to negotiate to be part of any “European preference” scheme or it will absolutely find itself left even more out in the cold. EU members are broadly open to the UK being included, certainly in some sectors – Macron has said the club should be as big as possible – but as ever, there will be a price and it will depend if Britain is prepared to pay it.
From first-time commenter Wulf_Sternhammer: Is the EU as a political entity a barrier to European states mobilising effectively in the face of the challenges before them, eg. Ukraine, China, immigration, economics. Will this force the states to abandon or fundamentally change the current arrangement? What could that look like? Jon: Think we pretty much covered this one in the very first answer, but I’d just add that there’s a very common and very big misconception about how the EU works – it’s the European Council, ie the heads of state and government of the member states, that really pull the strings, not the commission. The commission pitches ideas, then executes *what the member states agree on*. So the EU as a “political entity” is just an assembly of its members, who almost never agree on everything but can usually agree on something (or find a way round their disagreements). As described above, I think “enhanced cooperation” (which worked for the latest €90bn tranche of funding for Ukraine, for example) could prove a really useful mechanism. From Froghole2: Should Europe now be making a more determined effort to re-engage with the global south and, if so, on what terms which can appeal to the economic aspirations of the global south? Jon: Yes, absolutely. It really has to if only because if it doesn’t it’s (again) going to be hit for six by the more transactional powers: China, which has been busy for a decade already with Belt and Road, plus a newly protectionist US. It needs to reengage to stay geopolitically relevant; to secure (this is important) critical supply chains, especially minerals for the green transition; to access the world’s youngest, fastest growing workforce and consumer market; to help manage migration. It obviously has to do it in a very different way to in the past - the donor/recipient relationship, unfavourable and unilaterally imposed trade conditions, lectures on European values etc have left a major trust deficit towards Europe which is very evident from polling in the global south. So there is actually quite an interesting plan for this, no real time to go into it in detail here but it’s called global gateway and in brief it focuses on investments in “soft” infrastructure (digital networks, green energy grids, health systems) rather than bridges and motorways, emphasising technology transfer and local skill-building, co-designing projects with local governments, that kind of thing. It’s a €300bn project, we’ll see how it pans out. But there’s a lot of ground to make up, obviously.
From TomTom888: Orbán has sought to undermine Europe and side with Putin time and time again. Is it time to let Hungary go? Possibly other member states, eg. Slovakia? Jon: Ah the perennial problem of Viktor Orbán. The EU is partly to blame for the way Orbán is now (it, or more specifically the conservative group in the European parliament that basically humoured him for far too long), and it’s since been reluctant to really use the biggest weapons in its armoury (getting really aggressive with financial conditionality, ie withholding even more money; stripping him of voting rights or at least veto rights). It’s, again, the EU’s biggest hurdle: it’s a union of 27 very different countries each with their own national interests whose DNA dictates concession and compromise. I think many are quietly hoping he will lose April’s elections and the problem will go away of its own accord, much as it has with Law & Justice (PiS) in Poland. If not, you’re right, firmer action will need to be contemplated. From Samsoun: What do you see for the future of US military bases in the UK and the EU? Does the presence of US troops in other countries actually threaten national security now rather than support it? Jon: I think there’s understandably an enormous reluctance across Europe to undertake any move at the moment that risks straining transatlantic tensions any further than they already are, and kicking US troops out of Europe would certainly do that. There’s a very major readjustment going on, a realisation that Europe absolutely needs to massively build up its own military capability but at the same time an understanding that the continent’s security still depends to a large extent on the US. There have been very strong rumours, since to some extent denied, that Washington plans to pull its troops out of its own accord. It seems likely there will now be a few minor pull-outs and some reshuffling, but no mass withdrawal. There are plenty on the continent who still harbour the hope that the US will somehow “return to normal” in a few years’ time, but even those who are convinced it will not – who are also plentiful – consider that provocation is probably not the best course of action right now.
From Nodules: Will further federalisation of the EU be necessary to ensure more coherent policy-making? Jon: Federalism and federalisation are such tricky terms … anathema to many. I think Macron was quite interesting this week in the big interview he gave to half a dozen European newspapers, he talked about “pragmatic federalism” which he described as “uniting quickly and deciding together”. There’s very little chance of the treaties being changed any time soon, so Europe needs to work within its existing structures and find ways forward - as mentioned in a couple of answers above, “enchanced cooperation” looks quite hopeful. From first time commenter Adwardian: Why aren’t more mainstream politicians promoting a positive, pan-European message that emphasises aspirational unity to counterbalance the (negative-coded) defense unity? For France specifically: as the only nuclear power in the EU, shouldn’t candidates for next year’s watershed presidential election be discussing France’s role as a leading military force to help shape that unity? Jon: This is such an interesting question. I saw it in the UK during the Brexit campaign and I’ve seen it all over Europe, including very much in France: national politicians are extraordinarily reluctant to make positive arguments for Europe, and citizens are extraordinarily ignorant about how the EU actually works and what it actually does for them (and at what cost). Europe obviously has its faults (and many of them), but it is such an easy scapegoat in national politics and the subject of so much disinformation that until that issue is resolved this issue is going to remain. The EU’s biggest single problem is its inability to sell itself. We should start teaching what the EU is (warts and all, but *true* rather than fabricated warts) and what it does in primary school. From OleksandrKolosov: Is Brexit reversible? Jon: UK-EU rapprochement is certainly possible quite soon. Brexit itself may be reversible, but not for a good while. It will depend entirely on UK politics, what the UK asks for, and what it can bring itself to offer in return. At the moment there’s still a very strong strain of exceptionalism in British politics which means the “it’ll have to be on our terms” discourse still holds sway.
