US and Israel’s strategy to kill Iran’s top figures may prove counterproductive
Israel’s decision to authorise its military to kill any senior Iranian official on its assassination list has raised significant new questions about its so-called decapitation strategy – and what it is intended to achieve. Privately, Israeli officials have briefed their US counterparts that in the event of an uprising, Iran’s opposition would be “slaughtered” . That appears to be at odds with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy to pursue regime change by targeting senior figures in Iran’s political and security apparatus. Even before the outbreak of full scale war, however, Iran experts and analysts – and some former Israeli officials – were sceptical that Iran’s clerical regime could be toppled by such strikes. So far the targeted attacks have killed supreme leader Ali Khamenei, security chief Ali Larijani and intelligence minister Esmail Khatib, among others. At the heart of the issue is the structure and resilience of Iran’s regime – and how both the regime and the Iranian public respond to such attacks. Before the US and Israel launched their attacks three weeks ago, experts had assessed that the regime was stagnating in the face of protests and that some kind of change appeared inevitable. That dynamic has now been changed. “This isn’t a personalised regime,” said Sanam Vakil, an Iran expert at Chatham House. “There are institutional layers under every individual and I suspect that the response to decapitation strikes would be to simply to promoting from within – although that risks bringing up unknown and untested individuals. “Given the Israeli success rate you could imagine there are perhaps lower rank individuals not so amenable to moving up the system in what is dangerous work.” Thus far, Vakil does not judge Israel’s decapitation strategy to have been successful. “At the moment it seems to be buying time, and I’m not sure what the US is trying to achieve, but there exists a potential for air to be blown back into the system to rejuvenate a regime that was becoming a spent force where the people moving up have seen their mentors and their bosses and family members killed. “It is not an approach that produces Jeffersonian democrats but hardened resistance fighters. It breeds more resistance,” she said. Israel’s history of assassination does not point to much success. Over the years Israel has killed numerous senior leaders in Hamas and Hezbollah, including Hamas’s spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin in 2004, and Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah. Yet while Israeli campaigns have diminished those groups, both have rebounded. Jon B. Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, is another sceptic, citing the example of Hamas, which “as a political movement, absorbed its martyrs and lives to fight another day. “Unfortunately meaningful improvement through decapitation is unlikely,” he wrote in a recent post. “Each situation is unique, and each involves an element of chance. Still, the track record for advancing ambitious political goals — which is what the United States has — through a limited military effort is poor. While he cites the example of the killing of Osama bin Laden as an example of how a non-state group can be degraded significantly by the removal of a leader, Alterman says the Israeli attempt to decapitate a state is “unprecedented.” “One of common myths in the US government post-9/11 and before the invasion of Iraq was that you simply had to remove the ‘dirty dozen’ [of senior regime figures] in Iraq,” he told the Guardian. “I thought it was ill-conceived then and ill-conceived now. An issue that has not got sufficient attention is that if you eliminate the people who have credibility with the nasty guys there is nobody with influence to make the nasty guys stop. “It also feels like the resilience of the regime is being underestimated. Maybe it is possible to create an internal split, but I don’t know any evidence of moderate democrats waiting in wings.” For Alterman the “most likely outcome” of the decapitation strategy “is an internally unstable Iran” that is more likely to carry out acts of violence outside borders, either via cyber warfare, proxies or terrorism. Complicating the issue, is that a successful popular uprising is not even necessarily the most likely outcome of a destabilised regime. In a January essay for American magazine Foreign Affairs, Afshon Ostovar, a Middle East expert at the Naval Postgraduate School predicted that any coup would more likely come from within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – the strongest actor in the country – and would be aimed at preserving existing institutions, a potential dynamic that still holds. Steven Simon, a security expert at Dartmouth College, and former National Security Council staff, wrote in War on the Rocks: “The scenario that deserves more attention than it is getting[is] not Iranian collapse, but Iranian persistence; wounded, revanchist, and ungovernable by the tools that won the war.” “There also something perverse about this,” adds Vakil. “What Israel and the US are pursuing, that makes me so uncomfortable, is that there is no agency or choice or justice for Iranians in this process.”






